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Abstract
The authors explored the validity of two perspectives as to how managers evaluate subor-
dinates who resist downward influence attempts: a uniformly dysfunctional perspective 
(i.e., managers regard all manifestations of resistance as indicators of ineffective influence 
and rate subordinates unfavorably when they resist) and a multifunctional perspective 
(i.e., managers regard some manifestations of resistance as more constructive than others 
and rate subordinates more favorably when they employ constructive resistance tactics). 
The results of two studies provided support for an interactive model, which predicts that 
the uniformly dysfunctional perspective is characteristic of lower quality leader-member 
exchange (LMX) relationships and that the multifunctional perspective is characteristic of 
higher quality leader-member exchanges. 
Keywords: resistance behavior, leader-member exchange, downward influence, perfor-
mance evaluations 
One of the promising approaches to understanding managerial leadership fo-
cuses on downward influence, managers’ attempts to exercise social control over 
subordinates’ perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors. This research stream has 
identified the means by which managers influence their subordinates (e.g., Kip-
nis, Schmidt, & Wilkinson, 1980), how subordinates respond to managers’ down-
ward influence attempts (e.g., Yukl, Kim, & Falbe, 1996; Yukl & Tracey, 1992), and 
the outcomes associated with different kinds of responses to downward influ-
ence attempts (Falbe & Yukl, 1992). An important but relatively unexplored as-
pect of downward influence processes has to do with instances in which subordi-
nates resist their managers’ requests (Yukl, Fu, & McDonald, 2003). In particular, 
little is known about managers’ perceptions of, and responses to, subordinates’ 
resistance. 
In the sections that follow, we argue that management researchers have implic-
itly advanced what appear to be competing perspectives as to how managers per-
ceive subordinates’ resistance in formal organizations. According to the first per-
spective, managers regard subordinates’ resistance as uniformly dysfunctional, that 
is, managers regard all manifestations of resistance as indicators of ineffective in-
fluence. The second perspective suggests that subordinates’ resistance is multi-
functional in the sense that managers regard some manifestations of resistance as 
being more constructive than others. Next, we develop the notion that each per-
spective has some validity but that each is likely to be supported in different sit-
uations. Specifically, we argue that managers’ perceptions of subordinates’ resis-
tance in lower quality leader-member exchange (LMX) relationships (Graen & 
Uhl-Bien, 1995) will be consistent with the uniformly dysfunctional perspective 
(i.e., managers regard all forms of resistance as dysfunctional and will, therefore, 
assign lower performance evaluations to lower LMX subordinates regardless of 
the way they resist) and that managers’ perceptions of subordinates’ resistance 
in higher quality LMX relationships will be consistent with a multifunctional per-
spective (i.e., managers regard some forms of resistance as being more functional 
than others and, therefore, managers’ evaluations of higher LMX subordinates 
will vary depending on the way they resist). Using a two-study design, we then 
examine the moderating effects of LMX—the extent to which manager-subordi-
nate relationships are characterized by a high degree of mutual trust, respect, and 
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loyalty (i.e., high-LMX relationships) or are more contractually defined exchanges 
based on limited trust and in-role interactions (i.e., low LMX relationships; Uhl-
Bien, Graen, & Scandura, 2000)—on the relationship between subordinates’ resis-
tance and managers’ evaluations of subordinates’ incident-specific performance 
(Study 1) and performance in general (Study 2). 
Theoretical Background
Alternative Perspectives on Subordinates’ Resistance 
Subordinates’ resistance as uniformly dysfunctional. Falbe and Yukl (1992) identi-
fied three qualitatively different responses to managers’ downward influence at-
tempts, two that reflect conformity (i.e., commitment and compliance) and one 
that reflects nonconformity (i.e., resistance). Commitment refers to responses in 
which the target internalizes the influence objective and is willing to work hard 
to accomplish it, compliance involves reluctant and unenthusiastic conformity, 
and resistance involves instances in which the target is opposed to the request 
and withholds performing it. Because most organizational-influence research has 
emphasized interactions in which agents get their way (i.e., the target’s response 
reflects commitment or compliance), less is known about situations in which tar-
gets resist managers’ influence attempts. According to Yukl (2002), to resist man-
agers’ influence attempts, subordinates 
make excuses about why the request cannot be carried out, try to persuade the 
agent to withdraw or change the request, ask higher authorities to overrule the 
agent’s request, delay acting in the hope that the agent will forget about the re-
quest, make a pretense of complying but try to sabotage the task, or refuse to 
carry out the request. (p. 143) 
However, despite the variety of resistance tactics suggested by Yukl, management 
research has typically conceptualized subordinates’ resistance to downward in-
fluence attempts as a unidimensional construct (e.g., Barry & Shapiro, 1992; Falbe 
& Yukl, 1992; Yukl et al., 1996). 
Moreover, although management theorists have recognized that resistance is 
an appropriate response to unethical or inadvisable influence attempts and have 
provided guidelines concerning how subordinates should resist inappropriate re-
quests made by superiors (e.g., Chaleff, 1995; Whetten & Cameron, 1991), most 
management research has treated subordinates’ resistance as an indicator of the 
ineffective use of interpersonal influence tactics (Brower & Abolafia, 1995). For 
example, Maslyn, Farmer, and Fedor (1996) characterized influence attempts that 
culminate in resistance as “failed” influence, and Tepper, Eisenbach, Kirby, and 
Potter (1998) characterized resistance episodes as being indicative of managerial 
ineffectiveness. Fu and Yukl (2000) measured influence effectiveness using a scale 
in which high scores were associated with getting the “target person … to do 
what the agent wants” (p. 258). Studies conducted by Falbe and Yukl (1992) and 
Yukl et al. (1996) also illustrate this perspective. In these studies, influence effec-
tiveness was operationalized by coding influence outcomes as a continuous vari-
able with resistance equal to 1, compliance equal to 2, and commitment equal to 
3, and treating higher scores as indicators of greater effectiveness. 
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Subordinates’ resistance as multifunctional. A rich body of social psychological 
research has identified circumstances in which resistance involves overcoming 
strong situational pressures to conform to decisions or courses of action that are 
obviously incorrect (Asch, 1951), inadvisable (Janis, 1972), or unethical (Milgram, 
1963). Nonconformity in the Milgram studies, for example, has been referred to as 
principled dissent, conscientious objection, and constructive resistance. Of course, the 
Milgram studies, which involve inappropriate requests by authority figures to in-
jure a third party, differ from the sources of influence that management research-
ers typically investigate. The group dynamics literature suggests that groups may 
influence the behavior of members by developing and enforcing norms that are 
counterproductive (e.g., withholding productivity) and that violating those norms 
may be a desirable response from the organization’s standpoint (Feldman, 1984; 
Hackman, 1976). These research traditions suggest that there may be instances in 
which resistance represents a constructive response to routine organizational in-
fluence attempts (Darley, 1995; Gamson, Fireman, & Rytina, 1982). 
Consistent with that perspective, communication researchers (e.g., Alberts, 
Miller-Rassulo, & Hecht, 1991; Burroughs, Kearney, & Plax, 1989; Dillard, 1990; 
Lamude & Scudder, 1992; Lim, 1990; Manusov, 1989; McLaughlin, Cody, & 
Robey, 1980; McQuillen, Higgenbotham, & Cummings, 1984; O’Hair, Cody, & 
O’Hair, 1991) routinely treat resistance to interpersonal influence as a multifunc-
tional construct, assuming that resistance consists of distinguishable subdimen-
sions and that agents use different resistance behaviors to accomplish different 
objectives. As examples, Manusov (1989) inductively identified five tactics indi-
viduals use to resist friends’ influence attempts, Alberts et al. (1991) inductively 
derived four strategies with which students resist offers of drugs and alcohol, 
and McLaughlin et al. (1980) deductively derived a five-factor model of resistance 
individuals use in conflictive interactions. Moreover, in the one communication 
study that explored the consequences of different kinds of resistance, Lim (1990) 
found that experimental respondents were more verbally aggressive when their 
task was to persuade someone who resisted in an unfriendly manner (character-
ized by disagreeing with what the respondent said, eschewing the use of in-group 
pronouns like we and us, and offering negative feedback such as head shaking) as 
opposed to a friendly manner (characterized by agreeing with the respondent as 
long as agreement does not imply conformity, acknowledging that the respon-
dent did a good job on his or her part of a task, showing solidarity by using in-
group pronouns, and giving positive feedback such as head nodding). 
Taken together, these studies suggest that influence agents distinguish be-
tween different kinds of resistance, although the ways people resist varies across 
contexts. Despite these discrepancies, however, there are some common themes 
that emerge across communication contexts and that provide clues as to the kinds 
of resistance strategies individuals use in formal organizations. Specifically, the 
communication typologies differentiate between behaviors designed to voice dis-
agreement without damaging the relationship with the influence agent (e.g., “po-
liteness,” Manusov, 1989; “rebuttal,” Burroughs et al., 1989; Lamude & Scudder, 
1992; and “negotiation,” McLaughlin et al., 1980; O’Hair et al., 1991) and aggres-
sive responses designed to frustrate the agent (e.g., “nonnegotiation,” McLaugh-
lin et al., 1980; O’Hair et al., 1991; “deception,” Alberts et al., 1991; and “disrup-
tion,” Burroughs et al., 1989). 
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In the only studies that have explored resistance as a multidimensional con-
struct in organizations, Tepper, Schriesheim, et al. (1998) and Tepper, Duffy, 
and Shaw (2001) distinguished between two kinds of resistance that closely 
parallel these broad themes. In both studies, the resistance dimensions were 
termed constructive resistance, which involves efforts to open a meaningful dia-
logue with managers, and dysfunctional resistance, which involves efforts to dis-
rupt work flows and to thwart and undermine the manager. However, because 
these terms conflate resistance behavior and resistance outcomes, we employed 
labels for the two dimensions that are descriptive of subordinates’ resistance be-
havior. For example, rather than using the term constructive to refer to behav-
iors like convincing the agent that a request may not be worthwhile, suggest-
ing that a request should be done differently, or explaining that the presumed 
benefits of performing a request will not be realized, we used the label negoti-
ating, an outcome-neutral term that more accurately describes the item content 
and that has precedent in communication research. In addition, we eschewed 
the term dysfunctional to capture behaviors like ignoring requests, making a 
half-hearted effort, or just saying “no,” invoking instead the outcome-neutral 
label refusing. 
Tepper, Schriesheim, et al. (1998) found that subordinates’ self-reported refus-
ing was negatively related to managers’ evaluations of their performance and 
that negotiating was positively related to performance. Tepper et al. (2001) found 
that subordinates were more likely to resist (negotiate and refuse) when their su-
pervisors were more abusive but that these effects depended on the subordinate’s 
personality; conscientious subordinates, on the other hand, resisted hostile super-
visors by negotiating, and less conscientious subordinates resisted by refusing. 
These studies provide support for the idea that although resistance may be a less 
desirable response to downward influence compared to commitment or compli-
ance, subordinates use different kinds of resistance tactics to accomplish different 
objectives, and that managers are more favorably disposed to subordinates who 
negotiate as opposed to those who refuse. 
Subordinates’ Resistance and Managers’ Evaluations of Subordinates’ 
Performance 
To summarize the preceding discussion, the uniformly dysfunctional per-
spective would predict that managers will regard both forms of resistance, ne-
gotiating and refusing, as equally ineffective. That is, managers will assign low 
performance ratings to subordinates regardless of the way they resist. In con-
trast, from the multifunctional perspective, it may be predicted that managers 
respond differently to refusing and negotiating; specifically, managers will as-
sign lower performance ratings when subordinates refuse compared to when 
they negotiate. In this section, we develop the argument that both perspectives 
have validity and that support for the uniformly dysfunctional and multifunc-
tional perspectives depends on the nature of the exchange relationship between 
the manager and the subordinate. Specifically, we contend that the uniformly 
dysfunctional model will be supported in the case of lower quality LMX rela-
tionships and that the multifunctional model will be supported with respect to 
higher quality LMX relationships. 
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LMX theory and research describes differentiated relationships between man-
agers and subordinates (e.g., Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1991, 1995). These relationships 
are generated through social exchanges (Liden, Sparrowe, & Wayne, 1997) in 
which dyad members undergo a series of interactions based on reciprocity (Uhl-
Bien & Maslyn, 2003) and testing processes (Uhl-Bien et al., 2000). LMX qual-
ity forms relatively quickly, from a few days to a few weeks, and remains rela-
tively stable once established (Dockery & Steiner, 1990; Liden, Wayne, & Stilwell, 
1993). Higher quality relationships involve reciprocity that is based on mutual in-
terest (i.e., rather than self-interest), low immediacy (i.e., long time spans of rec-
iprocity), and low equivalence (i.e., exchanges that do not have to be of equiva-
lent value) (Uhl-Bien & Maslyn, 2003). As a result, dyad members do not worry 
about “score keeping” (Mitchell & Uhl-Bien, 2004), and they monitor only for ma-
jor trust violations (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). Managers view high-LMX subor-
dinates as “trusted assistants” who could “cover” for them if needed, which al-
lows these subordinates greater negotiating latitude (Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 
1975; Graen & Cashman, 1975) and decision influence (Scandura, Graen, & No-
vak, 1986). Lower quality LMX relationships involve low communication, lack of 
respect, and an absence of loyalty (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1991; Uhl-Bien et al., 2000); 
managers see low-LMX individuals as “hired hands” (Dansereau et al., 1975) who 
are self-interested and untrustworthy (Uhl-Bien & Maslyn, 2003). 
Given this as background, what role does LMX play in managers’ responses to 
subordinates’ resistance? According to the resistance literature, managers should 
infer that subordinates are relatively unconcerned about task accomplishment 
when they ignore managers’ requests, respond in a passive-aggressive fashion, 
or blatantly refuse (i.e., when they resist by refusing; Tepper, Schriesheim, et al., 
1998). Moreover, to the extent refusing communicates that the subordinate is un-
cooperative, managers should see little likelihood that this form of resistance will 
culminate in acceptable task outcomes (e.g., high-quality work) or relational out-
comes (e.g., favorable relations between the manager and subordinate). Refus-
ing, therefore, has the potential to engender dysfunctional conflict, disagreement 
between parties that can interfere with group and organizational effectiveness 
(Brehmer, 1976). On the basis of these arguments, we can expect that managers 
will be unreceptive to refusing as a resistance tactic. 
Our review of the LMX literature, however, suggests the need to qualify this 
prediction. Specifically, we expected that managers would view low-LMX refusers 
and high-LMX refusers differently. In low-LMX relationships, managers should 
perceive refusing negatively and in keeping with the low level of trust and gen-
erally poor quality of the relationship between the parties. In high-LMX relation-
ships, which are more mature partnerships based on trust, openness, and mutual 
support, managers should be inclined to give subordinates who refuse the benefit 
of the doubt (e.g., recognizing that the high-LMX subordinate may have had good 
reason to refuse). This line of reasoning is supported by evidence suggesting that, 
regardless of subordinates’ actual level of performance, managers generally as-
sign higher performance evaluations to high-LMX subordinates compared with 
low-LMX subordinates (Duarte, Goodson, & Klich, 1994). Consequently, we ex-
pected that high-LMX subordinates who refuse would be evaluated more favor-
ably than low-LMX subordinates who refuse, although these differences would 
be modest, given that refusing is generally regarded to be an undesirable means 
of communicating with one’s supervisor (Tepper, Schriesheim, et al., 1998). 
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In contrast, we expected that more dramatic differences would emerge with 
regard to negotiating. Specifically, when high-LMX subordinates ask managers 
to rethink the logic or need for a request (i.e., when they resist by negotiating), 
managers should interpret the behavior as a constructive and developmental re-
sponse, one that fits well with the kinds of contributions expected of trusted sub-
ordinates. For example, within the context of a high-LMX, “trusted assistant,” 
relationship, questioning the efficacy or logic of a downward influence attempt 
should be perceived as a sincere attempt to help the manager avoid unnecessary 
expenditures of resources (e.g., time and effort) or to provide an alternative per-
spective that the manager had not considered. Hence, managers should evaluate 
high-LMX subordinates more favorably when they resist by negotiating. In con-
trast, because managers tend to have low expectations of, and trust in, low-LMX 
subordinates and question the initiative and intentions of low-LMX subordinates 
(Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995), managers should be skeptical of, and assign lower per-
formance evaluations to, low-LMX subordinates who negotiate. 
Taken together, these arguments suggest an interaction between subordinates’ 
resistance and LMX. To specify the form of the interaction, we expected that man-
agers would assign lower performance evaluations to low-LMX subordinates when 
they resist by refusing and when they resist by negotiating. This pattern of low per-
formance ratings across the two types of resistance is consistent with the uniformly 
dysfunctional model. In contrast, and in keeping with the multifunctional model, 
we expected that managers would assign higher performance evaluations to high-
LMX subordinates who negotiate compared with high-LMX subordinates who re-
fuse (although we anticipated that high-LMX refusers would be rated more favor-
ably than low-LMX refusers). We therefore tested the following predictions: 
Hypothesis 1:  Leader-member exchange will moderate the relationship be-
tween subordinates’ resistance and managers’ evaluations of subordinates’ 
performance. Managers will assign lower performance evaluations to low-
LMX subordinates regardless of whether they resist by refusing or negotiating 
(Hypothesis 1a), and managers will assign higher performance evaluations to 
high-LMX subordinates who resist by negotiating compared with high-LMX 
subordinates who resist by refusing (Hypothesis 1b). 
Overview of the Research 
Resistance behavior may be investigated through the analysis of specific resis-
tance incidents (e.g., Falbe & Yukl, 1992) or of the frequency with which individ-
uals resist (e.g., Tepper et al., 2001). The former approach allows for a fine-grained 
analysis of the ways individuals perceive and respond to specific instances of re-
sistance; the latter approach decontextualizes resistance tactics and outcomes, 
thereby permitting researchers to investigate relationships between the frequency 
with which individuals resist and broader organizational phenomena. Hence, each 
approach has advantages, and choosing one over the other produces trade-offs in 
terms of the kinds of conclusions that researchers may draw. It is also important 
to note that, with respect to previous investigations of resistance in organizations, 
the studies that treated resistance as uniformly dysfunctional used research designs 
that focused on specific resistance incidents (Falbe & Yukl, 1992; Fu & Yukl, 2000; 
Maslyn et al., 1996; Yukl et al., 1996), and the two studies that treated resistance as 
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multifunctional explored the frequency with which subordinates resist (Tepper, 
Schriesheim, et al., 1998; Tepper et al., 2001). That is, the uniformly dysfunctional 
model derives from incident studies, and the multifunctional model derives from 
studies of the frequency with which subordinates resist. 
We therefore conducted two studies, employing different methods and oper-
ationalizations of our key variables. In Study 1, managers were first cued to re-
call instances in which one of their subordinates either refused or negotiated and 
then asked to provide incident-specific evaluations of their subordinates’ perfor-
mance. Study 2 involved a field survey in which subordinates reported the fre-
quency with which they refused and negotiated, and their managers provided a 
standard rating of their subordinates’ performance. 
Study 1: Method
Sample and Procedure 
We solicited respondents using a snowballing procedure that has been used 
successfully in other studies to generate heterogeneous samples of managers (e.g., 
Martins, Eddleston, & Veiga, 2002). We asked 185 evening MBA students to dis-
tribute up to five surveys to individuals employed in a supervisory capacity at 
the time of the study. We developed two surveys, one that cued respondents to 
recall a refusing incident and one that cued respondents to recall a negotiating in-
cident. Both surveys asked respondents to “think about the most recent instance 
in which you tried to get one of your employees to do something and your em-
ployee responded in one or more of the following ways.” The refusing survey fol-
lowed with “he or she refused to perform your request” and “he or she ignored 
your request.” The negotiating survey followed with “he or she explained that 
what you requested should be done a different way,” “he or she argued that the 
request would not yield the benefits you expected,” and “he or she tried to con-
vince you to reassess whether the request was worthwhile.” To reduce the effects 
of response bias, including experimental demand, the students were instructed to 
give each manager one survey (refusing or negotiating) and to not allow them to 
see the contents of the other form. As a further check, we included an open-ended 
question at the end of each survey that asked the participants to explain what 
they thought the purpose of the study was. No participants correctly guessed the 
purpose of our research. 
Five hundred twenty-one managers agreed to participate in the study, 375 of 
whom were able to recall a resistance episode that fit the cue they received. Elim-
inating surveys with missing data (n = 28) produced a sample size of 347 (174 re-
fusing and 173 negotiating). The average age of the respondents was between 35 
and 39 years old, and 65% were male. Open-ended responses to the instruction, 
“Please explain what you were trying to get your employee to do,” suggested that 
the content of the requests varied. Examples of the kinds of requests described by 
respondents included performing tasks that were initially assigned to someone 
else (e.g., making a presentation to higher management), completing urgent tasks 
(e.g., working overtime to meet a deadline), completing routine tasks (e.g., simple 
errands and clerical activities), and performing tasks that required a significant 
investment of time and effort (e.g., rewriting and editing a 200-page report and 
traveling across the country to meet with a dissatisfied client). 
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Measures 
Both surveys included measures of the subordinate’s incident-specific per-
formance with respect to the manager’s request and perceptions of LMX. For all 
analyses, we coded refusing equal to 1 and negotiating equal to 2. 
Performance. Respondents evaluate their subordinate’s incident-specific per-
formance using a four-item scale. The items consisted of a 7-point semantic dif-
ferential scale and were prefaced with instructions to “circle the number from 1 
to 7 that best describes how you rate your employee’s performance on this occa-
sion.” The anchor pairs were unfavorable-favorable, disruptive-helpful, ineffective-ef-
fective, and incompetent-competent. 
Leader-member exchange. The respondents also completed Graen, Novak, 
and Sommerkamp’s (1982) seven-item Leader-Member Exchange Scale (supervi-
sors’ version). Respondents used a 5-point response scale (1 = strongly disagree 
to 5 = strongly agree) to rate their level of agreement with such items as “I would 
characterize my working relationship with my subordinate as extremely effec-
tive” and “I understand my subordinate’s problems and needs.” We averaged 
the item scores to form total scores for LMX. 
Because the measures of performance and LMX were based on data collected 
from a single source, we assessed the dimensionality of the items using con-
firmatory factor analysis. We compared three rival ways of modeling the item 
covariance matrix: a null model in which all items loaded on separate factors, 
a one-factor model in which all items loaded on a common factor, and a two-
factor model in which the items designed to measure performance and LMX 
loaded on two separate, correlated factors. The fit of the two-factor model, 
χ2(43) = 352.57, p < .01, was superior to the fit of the one-factor model, Δχ2(1) 
= 1,125.03, p < .01, and the two-factor model’s Comparative Fit Index (.87) and 
root mean square error of approximation (.09) were reasonable, especially given 
that all cross-loadings were constrained to zero and no “garbage parameters” 
(e.g., correlated errors were estimated. All the lambda parameters for the two-
factor model were greater than .60, and all were significant (p < .01), and the di-
sattenuated correlation between performance and LMX was .47 (p < .01). Con-
sequently, we averaged the appropriate item scores to form total scores for 
performance and LMX. 
Control variables. Even though previous research has yielded conflicting re-
sults regarding the relationships between rater characteristics and performance 
ratings (Bretz, Milkovich, & Read, 1992), we nevertheless controlled for several 
background variables prior to testing our hypothesis. Specifically, we controlled 
for the manager’s sex (1 = male, 2 = female), age (1 = 18 to 24, 2 = 25 to 29, 3 = 30 
to 34, 4 = 35 to 39, 5 = 40 to 44, 6 = 45 to 49, 7 = 50 to 54, 8 = 55 to 59, 9 = 60 to 64, 
and 10 = over 64), education (1 = high school, 2 = some college, 3 = college degree, 4 
= advanced degree), and tenure with the subordinate (1 = less than 6 months, 2 = 6 
months to 1 year, 3 = 1 year to 2 years, 4 = 2 years to 3 years, 5 = 3 years to 5 years, 6 = 
more than 5 years). In addition, because managers may be more accepting of sub-
ordinates who fail to perform actions that fall outside of their job description (cf. 
Organ, 1988), we controlled for role definitions, the extent to which the request 
was part of the subordinates’ job requirements or beyond their job requirements. 
We measured role definitions with four items that asked the managers to report 
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the extent to which the request was “part of his or her job” (reverse scored), “be-
yond his or her job description,” “something that was above and beyond the call 
of duty,” and “a requirement of his or her job” (reverse scored). The items were 
prefaced with the statement, “What I asked my employee to do was,” and the re-
sponse scale ranged from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. We averaged 
the item scores and coded the responses so that higher scores meant that the re-
quest constituted extra-role behavior, a contribution that exceeded the subordi-
nate’s job description. 
Study 1: Results and Discussion
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the study variables. The criterion vari-
able, performance, correlated significantly with resistance, managers’ age, role 
definitions, and LMX. The signs on these correlations suggest that managers as-
signed higher performance ratings when subordinates negotiated rather than re-
fused, the manager was older, the manager perceived the request to be extra-role, 
and LMX was higher. 
Multiple Regression Results 
We tested our hypotheses by regressing performance on the control variables 
(Step 1), the main effects of resistance and LMX (Step 2), and an interaction term 
consisting of the Resistance × LMX cross product (Step 3). Table 2 shows the re-
gression results. The column labeled “Step 1” in Table 2 shows that the control 
variables explained 11% of the variance in performance ratings (p < .01). The beta 
weights associated with this equation suggest that managers assigned higher per-
formance ratings when the manager was older and when the request was extra-
role. The column labeled “Step 2” in Table 2 shows that the main effects of resis-
tance and LMX accounted for an additional 14% of the variance in performance 
ratings (p < .001). The signs on the beta weights at Step 2 suggest that managers 
assigned higher performance ratings when subordinates negotiated rather than 
refused and when LMX was higher. 
At Step 3, the Resistance × LMX interaction term accounted for significant in-
cremental variance in performance ratings (ΔR2 = .02, p < .01). We plotted this 
interaction using values of plus and minus one standard deviation around the 
mean for negotiating and LMX values of 1 (low LMX), 2 (moderate LMX), and 
3 (high LMX). We plotted this interaction using resistance values of 1 (refusing) 
and 2 (negotiating) and values of plus and minus one standard deviation from 
the mean on LMX (Aiken & West, 1991). The plot of this effect, which is shown 
in Figure 1, suggests that managers assigned lower performance ratings to lower 
LMX subordinates when they resisted by refusing and when they resisted by ne-
gotiating (b = .13, ns). Hence, Hypothesis 1a was supported. Figure 1 also shows 
that for higher LMX subordinates, managers assigned higher performance evalu-
ations when they resisted by negotiating compared to when they resisted by re-
fusing (b = .40, p < .01); hence, Hypothesis 1b was supported. As expected, higher 
LMX refusers received higher performance evaluations compared with lower 
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Figure 1. Interaction Between Leader-Member Exchange and Resistance (refusing versus 
negotiating) on Ratings of Subordinates’ Incident-Specific Performance in Study 1. (LMX = 
leader-member exchange) 
Table 2. Moderated Regression Results for Performance in Study 1 
                                                                                    Step 1                    Step 2                     Step 3 
Sex  .01  –.02  –.02 
Age  .14*  .08  .09 
Education  –.05  –.04  –.05 
Tenure with subordinate  –.03  –.03  –.04 
Role definitions  .30** .28**  .27** 
Resistance   .26** .26** 
Leader-member exchange   .26**  .26** 
Resistance × Leader-Member Exchange    .13** 
R2 change  .11**  .14**  .02** 
Total R2  .11**  .25**  .27** 
Note: N = 347. Tabled values are standardized beta weights. Resistance was coded as 
follows: refusing = 1, negotiating = 2. The variable, role definitions, was coded so that 
high scores involve extra-role or discretionary behavior and low scores involve in-role or 
required behavior. At Step 1, F(5, 341) = 8.41, p < .01; at Step 2, F(7, 339) = 15.94, p < .01; at 
Step 3, F(8, 338) = 15.20, p < .01. 
*p < .05 
**p < .01
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LMX refusers (t = 2.27, p < .05), but the difference in performance evaluations was 
stronger in magnitude when comparing higher LMX negotiators with lower LMX 
negotiators (t = 4.99, p < .01). 
Study 1 results provide support for our contention that managers’ evaluations 
of subordinates’ performance will be consistent with a uniformly dysfunctional 
perspective in the case of lower quality LMX relationships and a multifunctional 
perspective in the case of higher quality LMX relationships. However, Study 1, 
which involved an incident-specific examination of managers’ evaluations of sub-
ordinates who refused and negotiated, is not without methodological limitations. 
Specifically, cuing managers to recall incidents involving refusing or negotiating 
tells us little about how the frequency with which subordinates resist may be re-
lated to general performance evaluations. To the extent that the most recent resis-
tance incident managers can recall captures atypical behavior on the part of the 
referent subordinate, there may be little relationship between a manager’s inci-
dent-specific evaluation of the subordinate and his or her evaluation of the sub-
ordinate in general. Second, although the nature of our research design renders 
common method bias an unlikely explanation for our Study 1 findings (i.e., resis-
tance was operationalized by assigning managers to different cues, and there is 
no reason to believe that method variance should be stronger across different lev-
els of LMX), the reliance on single-source data is a limitation. 
Accordingly, we conducted a second study that focused on the frequency with 
which subordinates refuse and negotiate and managers’ general evaluations of 
subordinates’ performance. To address concerns about common method vari-
ance, we employed a dyadic research design in which subordinates reported the 
frequency with which they refused and negotiated when they resisted their man-
agers’ influence attempts, and managers completed a traditional performance rat-
ing scale using their subordinate as the referent. In addition, LMX was assessed 
using an interview protocol with the managers. 
As we mentioned earlier, the only study of the frequency of subordinates’ resis-
tance suggested that managers evaluate subordinates more favorably when they 
refuse with low frequency and when they negotiate with high frequency (Tepper, 
Schriesheim, et al., 1998), a pattern of findings that provided the basis for what 
we have referred to as the multifunctional model. As in Study 1, we expected that 
the multifunctional model would emerge for higher LMX subordinates; the ratio-
nale for this is that whereas refusing communicates disregard for the manager’s 
position and an unwillingness to negotiate unwanted requests, engaging in ne-
gotiating behaviors should be favorably received in the context of a trusting and 
supportive supervisor-subordinate relationship (i.e., high LMX). The uniformly 
dysfunctional model would predict that managers will assign low performance 
evaluations to subordinates who refuse with high frequency and to subordinates 
who negotiate with high frequency. That is, refusing and negotiating should be 
negatively related to managers’ ratings of subordinates’ performance. As in Study 
1, we expected that the uniformly dysfunctional pattern would emerge for lower 
LMX subordinates whose resistance behavior (be it refusing or negotiating) man-
agers regard with skepticism and mistrust. 
Taken together, these arguments lead to the prediction that refusing will be 
negatively related to performance ratings for both lower LMX subordinates and 
higher LMX subordinates and that negotiating will be positively related to per-
formance ratings for higher LMX subordinates and negatively related to perfor-
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mance ratings for lower LMX subordinates. That is, there will be a negative rela-
tionship between refusing and performance ratings, and the relationship between 
negotiating and performance ratings will depend on LMX exchange quality. 
Hypothesis 2: The frequency with which subordinates refuse will be nega-
tively related to managers’ evaluations of subordinates’ performance (across 
levels of LMX). 
Hypothesis 3: Leader-member exchange will moderate the relationship be-
tween the frequency with which subordinates negotiate and managers’ eval-
uations of subordinates’ performance; the relationship will be positive when 
LMX is high, and the relationship will be negative when LMX is low. 
Study 2: Method
Sample and Procedure 
We collected data from manager-subordinate dyads at 53 branches of a large 
midwestern financial institution. We developed two surveys, one that was com-
pleted by the branch managers and one that was administered to five randomly 
selected individuals who reported directly to the branch managers. The sur-
veys were coded so that managers’ and subordinates’ questionnaires could be 
matched. The surveys were administered by, and returned to, members of the 
research team, who traveled to each location to have face-to-face meetings with 
the branch managers and their randomly selected employees. The average age 
of the managers was 42 years, and 48% were women; the average age of the sub-
ordinates was 34 years, and 26% were women. Complete data were available for 
207 manager-subordinate dyads. Chi-square tests suggested that the age, sex, and 
tenure distributions of the managers and subordinates were representative of the 
organization’s population of employees. 
Measures 
Resistance. The subordinates completed Tepper et al.’s (2001) measures of re-
sistance to downward influence attempts, which capture the two dimensions of 
refusing (seven items) and negotiating (four items). The subordinates were in-
structed to indicate the frequency with which they used the behavior described 
in each item when they resist doing something their manager asks them to do. Il-
lustrative items are “I just say no,” “I ignore my boss” (refusing), “I convince my 
boss to reassess whether or not the task is worthwhile,” and “I explain that the 
task will not yield the expected benefits” (negotiating). The 5-point response scale 
consisted of the following anchors: 1 = I cannot remember ever using this tactic, 2 = 
I very seldom use this tactic, 3 = I occasionally use this tactic, 4 = I use this tactic moder-
ately often, and 5= I use this tactic very often. 
Prior to forming the resistance subscales, we assessed the dimensionality of 
the items using maximum likelihood confirmatory factor analysis. We compared 
three rival ways of modeling the item covariance matrix: a null model in which 
all items loaded on separate factors; a one-factor model in which all items loaded 
on a common factor; and a two-factor model in which the items designed to mea-
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sure refusing and negotiating loaded on two separate, correlated factors. The fit 
of the two-factor model, χ2(43) = 81.62, p < .01, was superior to the fit of the one-
factor model, Δχ2(1) = 69.27, p < .01. Moreover, the two-factor model’s Compar-
ative Fit Index (.88) and root mean square error of approximation (.07) were rea-
sonable. The lambda parameters for the two-factor model ranged from .40 to .85, 
and all were significant (p < .01). The disattenuated correlation between the latent 
refusing and negotiating constructs was .22 (p < .01). Consequently, we averaged 
the appropriate item scores to form total scores for refusing and negotiating. 
Performance. The managers rated their subordinates’ performance using a five-
item measure that was adapted from Mott’s (1972) scale. Previous research sug-
gests that the measure had good reliability and validity as a predictor of objective 
performance indicators (Fulk & Wendler, 1982; Schriesheim, 1980; Schriesheim, 
Neider, & Scandura, 1998). An illustrative item follows. “Productivity-quantity: 
Thinking of the various things that this person does for his or her job, how much 
is he or she producing (e.g., units produced, customers served, forms completed, 
pallets loaded, etc.)? Check one:” (A = his or her production is very low, B = it is 
fairly low, C = it is neither high nor low, D = it is fairly high, and E = it is very high). 
The other items measured production quality, production efficiency, anticipating 
problems and solving them satisfactorily, and awareness of potential new solu-
tions. We averaged the item scores to form total scores for performance. 
Leader-member exchange. To further minimize the potential problems asso-
ciated with relying on a single data collection method, we assessed LMX during 
face-to-face interviews with the managers that took place between 1 and 2 weeks 
after they completed the survey questionnaires. As part of the interview, the 
managers were asked to classify each subordinate as fitting into one of the fol-
lowing categories: (a) “I have a close relationship with this employee, one charac-
terized by high levels of trust, loyalty, and mutual respect” (high LMX); (b) “My 
relationship with this employee may be characterized as extremely formal in the 
sense that we do no more for one another than is specified by our respective job 
requirements” (low LMX); or (c) “Somewhere between a close relationship and a 
formal one” (moderate LMX). 
We gave the managers an option of choosing a moderate level because a pi-
lot test with an independent sample of 25 managers from the same organization 
suggested that many had difficulty classifying their subordinates into a high-
LMX or low-LMX group. It is also consistent with LMX theorizing, which de-
scribes three groups (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1991, 1995; Uhl-Bien et al., 2000). In to-
tal, the managers classified 66 subordinates as high LMX, 103 as moderate LMX, 
and 39 as low LMX. We investigated the validity of this method of categorizing 
manager-subordinate relationships by administering surveys to an indepen-
dent sample of 97 MBA students who were employed in a managerial capacity. 
The manager-students received one of three surveys, all of which were prefaced 
with the statement, “Managers differentiate among their subordinates, estab-
lishing one of three kinds of relationships” and the same category descriptions 
presented above. The three forms of the survey differed in terms of the instruc-
tions that followed, which involved a cue to think about a current subordinate 
with whom the student-manager had a “close working relationship,” “a highly 
formal relationship,” or “a relationship that was between close and formal.” 
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Eighty-four participants indicated that they had a subordinate who fit the cate-
gory described in their survey and for purposes of analysis, we coded the sur-
veys as follows: 3 = close (i.e., high LMX, n = 29), 2 = between close and formal (i.e., 
moderate LMX, n = 30), and 1 = formal (i.e., low LMX, n = 25). The student man-
agers also completed the seven-item LMX scale that we used in Study 1, and we 
averaged the item scores to form total scores on this measure. The correlation 
between scores on the three-category coding approach and scores on the tradi-
tional paper-and-pencil measure was .89 (p < .001). Hence, the interview proto-
col we used in Study 2 appears to be a valid means of categorizing subordinates 
as being high, moderate, or low LMX. 
Control variables. In Study 2, we controlled for subordinates’ and manag-
ers’ sex (1 = male, 2 = female), subordinates’ and managers’ age (1 = 18 to 24, 2 = 
25 to 30, 3= 31 to 40, 4 = 41 to 49, 5= over 50), and subordinates’ tenure with the 
manager (1 = less than 6 months, 2 = 6 months to 1 year, 3 = 1 year to 2 years, 4 = 
2 years to 3 years, 5 = 3 years to 5 years, 6 = more than 5 years) prior to testing the 
hypotheses. 
Study 2: Results and Discussion
Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for Study 2. The alpha internal-con-
sistency reliability coefficients for the Refusing and Negotiating subscales were 
acceptable (i.e., ≥ .70; Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). Job performance correlated 
positively with subordinates’ age, subordinates’ tenure, supervisor’s age, subor-
dinates’ negotiating, and LMX, and negatively with subordinates’ refusing. 
Moderated Regression Results 
We tested the hypotheses by regressing performance on the control variables 
(Step 1); the main effects of LMX, refusing, and negotiating (Step 2); and two 
two-way interaction terms represented by the Refusing × LMX and Negotiating 
× LMX cross products (Step 3). Hypothesis 2, that refusing is negatively related 
to performance across levels of LMX, would be supported if there is a main ef-
fect of refusing at Step 2 and the effect of the Refusing × LMX cross product is 
not significant at Step 3; Hypothesis 3, that LMX moderates the relationship be-
tween negotiating and performance, would be supported if the Negotiating × 
LMX cross product explains significant incremental variance at Step 3 and the 
plot of the interaction conforms to our predictions. Table 4 shows the regression 
results. 
The column labeled “Step 1” in Table 4 shows that the control variables ac-
counted for 11% of the variance in performance ratings, which was significant (p 
< .01). The standardized beta weights suggest that subordinates’ age and tenure 
were positively related to performance, and the effect for subordinates’ sex ap-
proached significance (p < .10). Older subordinates and subordinates with lon-
ger tenure received higher performance evaluations, and female subordinates re-
ceived higher evaluations compared with men. 
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At Step 2, the main effects of refusing, negotiating, and LMX explained an ad-
ditional 20% of the variance in performance, which was significant (p < .01). The 
standardized beta weights suggest that performance was positively related to ne-
gotiating and LMX and, consistent with Hypothesis 2, refusing was negatively re-
lated to performance. 
At Step 3, the two-way interaction terms explained an additional 2% of the 
variance in performance (p < .01). Table 4 shows that the Negotiating × LMX in-
teraction (β = .11, p < .05) was responsible for this effect. We plotted this inter-
action using values of plus and minus one standard deviation around the mean 
for negotiating and LMX values of 1 (low LMX), 2 (moderate LMX), and 3 (high 
LMX). The plot of this interaction, shown in Figure 2, reveals that Hypothesis 3 
was partially supported. The relationship between negotiating and performance 
was positive for high LMX (b = .30, p < .01) and for moderate LMX (b = .20, p < 
.05). However, when LMX was low, negotiating and performance were unrelated 
(b = .08, ns; the predicted negative relationship did not emerge). Low-LMX sub-
ordinates received low performance evaluations regardless of the frequency with 
which they negotiated. It should also be noted that the Refusing × LMX cross 
product did not explain significant incremental variance in performance, which 
comports with Hypothesis 2 (refusing was negatively related to performance 
across levels of LMX). 
Taken together, these results provide support for our thesis that managers’ 
evaluations of subordinates’ performance are consistent with the uniformly dys-
functional model in the case of low-LMX subordinates (because low-LMX sub-
ordinates received generally low evaluations when they refused with high fre-
quency and when they negotiated with high frequency) and the multifunctional 
model with respect to high-LMX subordinates (because high-LMX subordinates 
received lower evaluations when they refused with high frequency, and they re-
ceived favorable evaluations when they negotiated with high frequency). 
Table 4. Moderated Regression Results for Study 2 
                                                                              Step 1                     Step 2                     Step 3 
Subordinate’s sex  .11†  .12*  .10 
Subordinate’s age  .19**  .00  .02 
Subordinate’s tenure  .19*  .17**  .16* 
Manager’s sex  –.01  .01  –.01 
Manager’s age  .03  .05  .04 
Refusing   –.13*  –.14* 
Negotiating   .22**  .21** 
Leader-member exchange (LMX)   .41**  .38** 
Refusing × LMX    –.08 
Negotiating × LMX    .11*
R2 change  .11**  .20**  .02* 
Equation R2  .11**  .31**    .33** 
Note: N = 207. Tabled values are standardized beta weights. At Step 1, F(5, 201) = 4.92, p < 
.01; at Step 2, F(8, 198) = 11.08, p < .01; at Step 3, F(10, 196) = 9.49, p < .01. 
† p < .10 
*p < .05 
**p < .01
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General Discussion
Our research contributes to the literature that addresses subordinates’ re-
sponses to downward influence attempts. Few studies have explored how sub-
ordinates resist managers’ influence attempts, and most of that work has treated 
resistance as a unidimensional and uniformly dysfunctional phenomenon. Our 
research, which was rooted in the assumption that resistance consists of distin-
guishable subdimensions, tested the idea that managers’ evaluations of subordi-
nates depend on the way subordinates resist and the quality of the exchange rela-
tionship between the manager and the subordinate. 
To summarize our results, we found that managers evaluated lower LMX sub-
ordinates negatively regardless of the way they resisted, a pattern that is consis-
tent with what we referred to as the uniformly dysfunctional perspective (i.e., 
managers regard both refusing and negotiating as dysfunctional). In addition, 
consistent with the multifunctional perspective, the managers in Study 1 evalu-
ated higher LMX subordinates more favorably when they resisted by negotiating 
compared with when they resisted by refusing, and the managers in Study 2 eval-
uated high-LMX subordinates more favorably when they negotiated with higher 
frequency and less favorably when they refused with higher frequency. Taken 
together, our findings qualify the work of Falbe and Yukl (1992) and Yukl et al. 
Figure 2. Interaction Between Leader-Member Exchange and Subordinates’ Negotiat-
ing on Ratings of Subordinates’ General Performance in Study 2. (LMX = leader-member 
exchange)
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(1996), which carries the implicit assumption that all forms of resistance are in-
dicative of managerial ineffectiveness (i.e., the uniformly dysfunctional perspec-
tive), and the work of Tepper et al. (2001), which suggests that managers regard 
subordinates who negotiate more favorably than subordinates who refuse. As we 
surmised, each perspective has validity, but only with respect to specific kinds of 
manager-subordinate relationships. 
As expected, the managers in both studies generally rated lower LMX subor-
dinates unfavorably regardless of the way they resisted. In contrast, higher LMX 
subordinates were rated more favorably when they resisted by negotiating. From 
the perspective of managers, negotiating by high-LMX subordinates appears to 
be a well-intended response, one that can be used to open a dialogue when re-
quests warrant elaboration, clarification, or abandonment. However, it would be 
inappropriate to characterize negotiating as simply the means by which “good” 
subordinates resist because, in both studies, there was no relationship between 
LMX and resistance. This can be inferred to mean that lower LMX subordinates 
are just as likely to negotiate as are higher LMX subordinates but that managers 
are receptive only to negotiating by higher LMX subordinates. 
Contrary to expectations, there was no relationship between negotiating and 
performance for low-LMX subordinates in Study 2. The uniformly dysfunctional 
model was supported in the sense that low-LMX subordinates received low per-
formance evaluations when they negotiated with high frequency; however, there 
was no difference in the performance evaluations received by low-LMX subor-
dinates who negotiated with high frequency and those who negotiated with low 
frequency. Hence, when it comes to negotiating as a means of resisting down-
ward requests, low-LMX subordinates are “damned if they do and damned if 
they don’t” in the sense that they can expect to receive lower evaluations whether 
or not they negotiate. More generally, this finding is consistent with the idea that 
managers generally assign low performance ratings to low-LMX subordinates 
compared with high-LMX subordinates (Duarte et al., 1994; Kacmar, Witt, Ziv-
nuska, & Gully, 2003; Wilhelm, Herd, & Steiner, 1993). 
Among the control variables we included in the two studies, only role defi-
nitions with respect to specific requests in Study 1 were a strong and consistent 
predictor of managers’ evaluations of subordinates’ performance. As expected, 
managers assigned higher performance ratings when the request consisted of ac-
tivities that exceeded the subordinate’s job description. This finding is consistent 
with the literature that addresses citizenship behavior in organizations in that we 
would expect managers to look unfavorably on subordinates who withhold in-
role behaviors compared with subordinates who withhold extra-role behaviors 
(Organ, 1988). The fact that none of the demographic control variables were con-
sistently related to performance ratings was not unexpected given that previous 
research has revealed conflicting findings regarding the effects of rater and ratee 
characteristics on performance ratings (Bretz et al., 1992). 
Our research is not without limitations. One limitation has to do with the ef-
fect sizes associated with the interaction terms in our two studies. Specifically, the 
two-way interactions in Study 1 and in Study 2 explained only 2% of the variance 
in performance ratings. However, it has been argued that given the difficulty of 
detecting moderating effects in multiple regression analyses (McClelland & Judd, 
1993), even significant effect sizes of 1% are “worth taking seriously” (Aguinis, 
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2004: 141). Hence, although modest, the effect sizes that emerged in our two stud-
ies are not unimportant. 
A second limitation is that the nature of our studies precludes deriving causal 
inferences consistent with our conceptual framework; specifically, neither study al-
lows us to dismiss the possibility that performance causes subordinates’ resistance 
rather than the other way around. For that reason, our findings should be inter-
preted with caution, and our investigation should be viewed as merely the first step 
in the process of unraveling the performance implications of subordinates’ resis-
tance. Future research should make use of experimental and/or longitudinal meth-
ods so as to better articulate the causal sequencing of the variables we studied. 
A third limitation of our research is that we did not explore the means by 
which LMX moderates the relationships between subordinates’ resistance and 
managers’ evaluations of subordinates’ performance. One interpretation of our 
findings has to do with the concept of psychological contracts, the idea that or-
ganization members form expectations as to the obligations underlying the em-
ployment relationship (Rousseau, 1995). Rousseau (1998) has argued that appli-
cations of psychological contract theory and research have the potential to further 
our understanding of LMX relationships by shedding light on the expectations 
and obligations that are idiosyncratic to high-LMX and low-LMX relationships. 
Hence, for example, our findings with respect to high-LMX relationships could 
be interpreted to mean that, from the perspective of managers, high-LMX subor-
dinates may breach their psychological contract only when they refuse with high 
frequency. Another way of thinking about our findings has to do with the attri-
butions managers make for subordinates’ resistance. In the wake of resistance ep-
isodes, it may be argued that managers evaluate high-LMX subordinates more 
favorably because they make more external attributions for high-LMX subor-
dinates’ resistance (e.g., the request was inappropriate) and more internal attri-
butions for low-LMX subordinates’ resistance (e.g., the subordinate was lazy or 
obstinate). Future research could explore these ideas by assessing managers’ per-
ceptions of the psychological contract with their subordinates who resist and by 
measuring managers’ attributions for subordinates’ resistance. 
A final limitation is that in both studies, we measured LMX exchange from one 
perspective, the manager. In some studies involving matched pairs of supervisors 
and subordinates, researchers have reported modest convergence between super-
visor perceptions of LMX and subordinate perceptions of LMX, as well as evi-
dence suggesting that the relationships between LMX and other variables differ 
depending on whether LMX is measured from the supervisors’ perspective or the 
subordinates’ perspective (e.g., Liden et al., 1993; Scandura et al., 1986; Schriesheim 
et al., 1998). Consequently, although we believe that our study takes an impor-
tant first step by demonstrating that supervisors’ perceptions of LMX play a role 
in explaining when the uniformly dysfunctional and multifunctional models will 
be observed, future research should explore the extent to which similar findings 
emerge when LMX quality is measured from the subordinates’ perspective. 
Having acknowledged the limitations of our research, we would be remiss if 
we did not highlight an important feature of our work—that we obtained con-
verging findings across studies that made use of diverse methods and operation-
alizations of the key variables. As we noted earlier, resistance behavior has been 
studied at the level of specific incidents and in terms of the frequency with which 
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individuals use various resistance tactics. In fact, the uniformly dysfunctional 
model emerged from studies that relied primarily on incident-specific research 
designs (e.g., Falbe & Yukl, 1992; Yukl et al., 1996), whereas the multifunctional 
model grew out of studies that explored the frequency with which subordinates 
refuse and negotiate (e.g., Tepper et al., 2001; Tepper, Schriesheim, et al., 1998). 
Our study is the first to use both approaches simultaneously and in so doing il-
lustrates the advantages of multimethod research in studies of manager-subor-
dinate influence processes (Yukl, 1989). By showing that managers assign more 
favorable incident-specific evaluations to high-LMX subordinates who negotiate 
rather than refuse (Study 1) and that in the aggregate, and across the many influ-
ence episodes that occur in manager-subordinate relationships, managers eval-
uate higher LMX subordinates more favorably when they negotiate with higher 
frequency (Study 2), we were able to triangulate in on the role that LMX plays in 
the relationship between subordinates’ resistance and managers’ evaluations of 
subordinates’ performance (Rogelberg & Brooks-Laber, 2002). Our research has 
implications for management practice. From the perspective of managers, nego-
tiating by high-LMX subordinates appears to be a constructive and developmen-
tal response. For example, high-LMX subordinates should be more likely to have 
their grievances addressed when they use negotiation as compared to when they 
resist in a passive-aggressive fashion or when they blatantly refuse their man-
agers’ requests. It follows that subordinates’ resistance can be a useful source of 
feedback for managers who value their subordinates’ input. Whereas refusing 
has few advantages, negotiating in the form of requesting clarification or point-
ing out potential problems may help managers avoid ethical violations (Graham, 
1986) and mistakes that could adversely affect the organization’s bottom line (Van 
Dyne, Cummings, & Parks, 1995). However, to the extent managers are not recep-
tive to low-LMX subordinates’ negotiating, a potentially valuable source of in-
put may be overlooked. Consequently, it would be helpful to incorporate in man-
agement training programs the understanding that among the costs of dividing 
subordinates into high-and low-LMX groups is the possibility that managers may 
dismiss worthwhile feedback from low-LMX subordinates simply because they 
do not trust the source. 
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